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ABSTRACT 
In 2010, the USMC changed its Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) to include 
operational design in response to direction from the Commander of United States Joint 
Forces Command (USJFCOM).  This updated process however has proven to be 
misunderstood and fundamentally no different from the previous edition based upon the 
classical decision making model.  This thesis therefore presents an alternative planning 
process for the United States Marine Corps.  This thesis uses the foundations of systems 
architecting to redefine operational design as operational architecting and presents a 
detailed operational architecting process that translates strategic guidance into an 
operational design.  This operational design then becomes the starting point for the 
traditional military planning process.  The alternative planning process describes 
operational architecting as a distinct activity from operational planning but provides for a 
seamless transition between both activities and for multiple iterations if needed.  The 
thesis recommends this process as a baseline for further refinement and experimentation 
as the USMC further develops its planning theory and doctrine. 
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The United States Marine Corps foundational publication, Marine Corps 
Doctrinal Publication 1 Warfighting (MCDP 1, 1997) introduces every Marine to the 
fundamentals of how Marines think about and fight war.  Within the description of how 
Marines think on war, this doctrine introduces the three levels of war: strategic, 
operational and tactical.  Today, every Marine accepts the levels of war without 
disagreement or question, as if the earliest military theorists developed all three jointly.  
In reality, while the strategic and tactical definitions have long been included in 
American military lexicon, the concept of an operational level of war did not appear in 
American military doctrine until the 1970s (Naveh, 1997).  Since that time, American 
military doctrine has continually sought improvements to definitions, methodology and 
processes that link the strategic and tactical aspects of warfare (Naveh, 1997).  
Descriptions and definitions surrounding the operational level of war have matured over 
time and the Joint Publication 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms (JP 1-02) defines three of the most pertinent terms. 
• Operational level of war—The level of war at which campaigns and major 
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic 
objectives within theaters or other operational areas.  Activities at this 
level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational activities needed 
to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve 
operational objectives, initiating actions, and apply resources to bring 





• Operational art—The application of creative imagination by commanders 
and staff—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design 
strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ 
military forces.  Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across 
the level of war (JP 1-02, 2010). 
• Operational design—the conception and construction of the framework 
that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and it subsequent 
execution (JP 1-02, 2010). 
Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations (JP 3-0) describes the relation between operational 
art and design, stating that operational art is used during operational design to construct 
the operations framework (JP 3-0, 2010).  The operational framework is the mental 
picture that encompasses all activities occurring within the operational level of war, 
translating strategic guidance into cohesive tactical actions.  American military doctrine 
has traditionally relied upon a linear decision making process to facilitate the activities 
needed to create and manage this operational framework.  This process normally attempts 
to analyze the tasking, develop and compare alternate courses of action, make a decision 
and issue tasking (Schmitt, 2006).  Since the late 1990s, and in light of experiences in 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operational Iraqi Freedom (OIF), many 
American military thinkers have expressed concerns about the limits of this traditional 
approach.  General James N. Mattis while serving as the Commander, United State Joint 
Forces Command (USJFCOM) formally endorsed those concerns and declared that the 
classical decision making process, while useful, needed revamping. 
On October 6, 2009, General James N. Mattis published the Vision for a Joint 
Approach to Operational Design.  This document highlighted General Mattis’ assessment 
that the “current doctrinal approach to fostering clear, careful thinking and creativity, 
particularly early in design and planning is insufficient and ineffective” (USJFCOM, 
2009).  General Mattis continued to explain that: 
Standard planning processes, such as the Army’s military decision-making 
process and the more recent joint operation planning process, have served 
us well to this point; however, commanders and staffs generally tend to 
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“over-proceduralize” these processes and use them somewhat 
mechanically.  The complex nature of current and projected challenges 
requires that commanders routinely integrate careful thinking, creativity, 
and foresight.  Commanders must address each situation on its own terms 
and in its unique political and strategic context rather than attempting to fit 
the situation to a preferred template. (USJFCOM, 2009) 
In essence, General Mattis issues two challenges to the joint military community.  
First, he expects commanders to apply creative imagination, which is the essence of 
operational art, to operational planning.  Second, General Mattis challenges the staff of 
USJFCOM and other doctrine writers to better institutionalize creative imagination 
through improvements to planning processes by incorporating design.  He tasked 
USJFCOM to advocate for “migrating design-related improvements” to joint doctrine 
related to operational planning (USJFCOM, 2009).   
The United States Field Manual 5-0, The Operational Process (FM 5-0) defines 
design as the “methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, 
visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve 
them” (FM 5-0, 2010).  Design is an attempt to implement the systems philosophy and 
principles into the art and science of military planning.  Design applies systems principles 
and theory to military planning to help understand the environment and problem 
holistically as well as conceive a possible solution.  Design precedes and complements 
the more traditional linear planning processes that translate a desired solution into 
subordinate actions.  General James N. Mattis describes design in the Vision for a Joint 
Approach to Operational Design: 
Design does not replace planning, but planning is incomplete without 
design.  The balance between the two varies from operation to operation 
as well as within each operation.  Operational design must help the 
commander provide enough structure to an ill-structured problem so that 
planning can lead to effective action toward strategic objectives.  Executed 
correctly, the two processes always are complementary, overlapping, 
synergistic, and continuous. (USJFCOM, 2009) 
John F. Schmitt expresses these concepts graphically in A Systemic Concept for 
Operational Design (Schmitt, 2006); see Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.   Design-Planning Continuum (From Schmitt, 2006) 
Since October 2009, the joint community, U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps 
have continued to develop new processes for operational planning, finally issuing new 
editions of planning guidance in 2010 that incorporated design.  However, a careful read 
of these new publications yields no fundamentally new process or infusion of creative 
imagination.  In particular, the newly published Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) 
simply recycles the traditional planning process with a focus on group discussion before 
detail solution planning begins.  Planning doctrine seems to lack an institutionalized 
framework that fosters creative imagination because it fails to implement a methodology 
founded upon systems philosophy and principles. 
In response to General Mattis’ challenge and the doctrinal gap of recent planning 
documents, this thesis proposes an alternative planning framework.  A theoretical basis 
for critique and development of operational planning processes is presented and 
discussed first.  Then, this thesis focuses on the MCPP as outlined in Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1; Marine Corps Planning Process released August 
24, 2010.  This publication edition represents the Marine Corps’ attempt to follow 
General Mattis’ direction to incorporate design improvements to the operational planning 
process.  This thesis analyzes the new MCPP from the previously discussed theoretical 
basis and reviews attempted improvements to other joint and service planning processes.  
The thesis then proposes an alternative operational planning framework based upon on 
the elements of business design as described by Jamshid Gharajedaghi in Systems 
 5 
Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity, A Platform for Designing Business 
Architecture and elements of Rapid Systems Engineering (RSE) as applied by Professor 
Gary Langford in the paper Reducing Risk of New Business Start-ups Using Rapid 
Systems Engineering.  The proposed framework integrates the best practices of systems 
architects and business designers to build a methodology that is suited for the most 
complex situations but is scalable for all levels of command. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a framework for a USMC planning model.  
This thesis investigates the feasibility and benefits of applying best practices from the 
discipline of systems architecting and business design to the military operational planning 
framework.  The planning process combines elements of business design (Gharajedaghi, 
2006) and RSE (Langford, 2006) to create a more robust design-planning continuum 
(Schmitt, 2006).  The proposed framework provides another alternative planning model 
for consideration and possible experimentation for the United States Marine Corps. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis investigates the following research questions: 
1. Is design a valid expression of systems theory and principles to the 
operational level of war? 
2. Does the MCPP correctly integrate design into the planning methodology? 
3. Does joint and U.S. Army planning doctrine integrate design correctly? 
4. Is it possible to build a robust and scalable operational planning 
framework based upon elements of business design, RSE and best 
practices from the discipline of systems architecting? 
5. Would this new framework be useful as a starting point for further 
research and experimentation? 
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D. BENENFITS OF STUDY 
This study adds to existing research and literature that challenges the traditional 
linear planning processes common in the American military.  This thesis evaluates the 
current MCPP and other planning doctrine from a systems perspective and proposes an 
alternative framework based on business design, RSE and best practices of systems 
architecting.  This proposed framework could then become a reference point for further 
design and experimentation that improves how the American military understands, 
evaluates and plans complex military operations. 
E. SCOPE 
This thesis focuses primarily on evaluating the MCPP from a systems perspective 
and proposing an alternative operational planning framework based on business design, 
RSE and best practices of systems architects.  This thesis reviews literature pertaining to 
design as an expression of the systems philosophy to the operational level of war and 
conducts a top-level review of other planning doctrine within the Department of Defense. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
United States military doctrine expresses warfare on three levels: the strategic, 
operational and tactical and of the three, the operational level of war is relatively new to 
American military thought.  Since the 1970s, doctrine has continually sought definitions, 
methods and processes to effectively plan and execute warfare at the operational level.  
Traditionally, those methods and processes were linear, conforming to the traditional 
decision making process.  In the last ten years, military thinkers have realized the limits 
of the traditional approach and have investigated new theories and techniques used to 
develop the operational framework that translates strategic guidance into tactical actions. 
(USJFCOM, 2009)  These new ideas have centered on design, which attempts to apply 
systems theory and principles to the operational level of war.  However, a literature 
review of MCPP and other planning doctrine that attempts to integrate design proved 




apply systems thinking and theory to the operational level of war and proposes an 
alternative framework based upon business design, RSE and best practices of systems 
architects. 
Chapter II outlines the application of systems principles and theory to the 
operational level of war.  It briefly introduces the operational level of war and analyzes 
that warfighting discipline through a systems perspective.  Chapter II ends with a 
theoretical framework that is used to analyze current doctrine and build an alternative 
planning process.  Chapter III discusses the MCPP.  This chapter critiques its application 
of systems principles through integration of design to the planning process.  Chapter IV 
reviews joint and U.S. Army planning doctrine, assessing its planning methodology and 
processes from a systems perspective.  The major point for both Chapter III and Chapter 
IV is to evaluate current planning doctrine in light of the challenge by General Mattis to 
institutionalize a process that enhances creative imagination during planning.  Chapter V 
presents an alternative planning process based on business design, RSE and best practices 
from system architects.  This process is holistic, scalable and robust enough to meet the 
planning needs at any level of command.  Finally, Chapter VI discusses lessons learned 
and insights gained from a review of current planning doctrine and the proposed alternate 
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II. THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR AS A SYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For most of history, warfare consisted of strategy and tactics (Naveh, 1997).  Prior 
to the 1800s, the responsibility for strategic and tactical decisions normally resided in one 
national leader, either the king or emperor.  Normally, the king or emperor would decide 
on declarations of war, timing for battle, size of armies and objectives with the advice of 
trusted advisors.  The king or emperor would then either closely direct or personally lead 
his army into battle, directing its tactical deployment and engagement of the enemy 
possibly supported by the advice of professional soldiers.  Under this arrangement, one 
individual directed the onset of war and all related activities.  This relationship worked 
primarily because of the limited size of the armed forces involved and the resulting limits 
in time and space.  The business of warfare was manageable under a system that focused 
on strategic objectives supported by direct tactical actions, led by one individual (Naveh, 
1997). 
After the French Revolution and the new French Republic, the nation’s military 
began to increase dramatically.  This dramatic growth in armed forces continued 
throughout the 19th century and into most of the 20th century, resulting in an increase in 
the size of war and the resulting time and space consumed by military operations (Naveh, 
1997).  Under the weight of this new mass, the old systems developed to wage war fell 
apart.  Not all strategic and tactical responsibilities could rest on one individual.  The 
links between strategic objectives and tactical actions were no longer self-evident 
resulting in a “new problem in the conduct of war, in the intermediate sphere between the 
traditionally accepted levels of military planning” (Naveh, 1997).  Today, the American 
military identifies this intermediate level of war as the operational level of war, linking 
strategy and tactics.  Chapter II examines this level of war in detail, providing a 
knowledge baseline for the critique of doctrinal planning processes and for the 
introduction of a new operational planning framework.  This chapter accomplishes three 
objectives: 
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1. Summaries the American doctrinal description of the levels of war and 
analyzes them using a basic black box model. 
2. Establishes the operational level of war as a system described by the 
General Systems Theory. 
3. Applies the foundations of Systems Architecting to the operational level of 
war in order to develop a theoretical framework for analysis and 
development. 
Chapter II establishes the operational level of war as a system that can be designed 
utilizing the principles of systems architecting as a theoretical foundation. 
B. AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR 
American joint military doctrine articulates three levels of war: strategic, 
operational, and tactical.  Doctrine divides war into three levels to “clarify the links 
between national strategic objectives and tactical actions” (JP 3-0, 2010).  Figure 2 
portrays the levels of war graphically.  Distinct boundaries between the levels of war do 
not exist with activities often occurring across the levels of war.  Also, there are no 
particular units, equipment and levels of command associated with a particular level of 
war (JP 3-0, 2010).  The level of war framework is a mental model that supports the 
understanding, planning, and execution of all activities required to support the human 
endeavor of war. 
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Figure 2.   Levels of War (From MCDP 1, 1997) 
1. The Strategic Level of War 
The strategic level of war constitutes all activities that support the establishment 
of national strategic objectives and allocated resources.  In the United States, the 
President and presidential appointed leadership with advice from military leaders perform 
these functions.  At the strategic level, the President sets national policy either in 
response to world events or from his/her own initiative and the Secretary of Defense 
translates Presidential Policy into national strategic objectives (JP-3, 2010).  Activities at 
the strategic level of war involve “establishing goals, assigning forces, providing assets, 
and imposing conditions on the use of force in theaters of war” (MCDP 1, 1997).  Figure 
3 represents a black box functional decomposition of the strategic level of war based 
loosely on the modeling methodology described by Karl T. Ulrich and Steven D. 
Eppinger in their book, Product Design and Development (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2004). 
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Figure 3.   Black Box Functional Decomposition of Strategic Level of War  
(After Ulrich & Eppinger, 2004) 
This simple model graphically displays the nominal inputs and outputs associated 
with the strategic level of war.  The inputs and outputs are represented while the black 
box represents activities involved with developing national and military strategy (Ulrich 
& Eppinger, 2004).  At the strategic level, the capability of the United States government, 
world and national events, and Presidential initiatives are the major known inputs.  The 
outputs of the strategic level of war are national policy and national goals, allocated 
government resources for those goals, and a strategic communication and engagement 
plan.  The formulation of strategy is much more complex than represented in Figure 3 
because strategic activities must account for the economic situation and ramifications, 
reactions from friendly nations, and national politics to name a few.  However, from this 
mental exercise one can observe that the inputs and outputs of the strategic level of war 
are both abstract.  National leadership confronts complex situations and makes difficult 
decisions but generally the output is conceptual and not a real, actionable product.  
Metaphorically, national leaders conduct art like activities at the strategic level with very 
little science (Naveh, 1997). 
2. The Tactical Level of War 
The tactical level of war is the realm of warfighters.  At this level, the nation’s 
military accomplishes assigned objectives in other to support operational plans that link 







Strategic Level of War 
World Events 






battles, engagements and activities to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units 
or task forces” (JP 3-0, 2010).   Figure 4 represents a black box functional decomposition 
of the tactical level of war. 
 
Figure 4.   Black Box Functional Decomposition of Tactical Level of War 
In the tactical black box model, inputs are operational orders, a definite resource 
allocation in the terms of a task organization or homogenous military unit and tactical 
doctrine.  The military commander then devises the tactical plan to engage the enemy in 
battle or accomplish some other assigned mission.   The black box output consists of 
results of the battle or actions taken, a material loss or gain and signals and messages.  At 
a minimum, those signals and messages would involve the local and U.S. populace as 
well as leadership perceptions and value judgments concerning the results.  At the tactical 
level, commanders operate mostly according to more scientific principles.  Commanders 
receive specific missions and resources and execute according to doctrine and training.  
Studying this basic black box model, inputs and outputs remain similar, both having 
mechanical and quantifiable characteristics (Naveh, 1997).  This level of war is by no 
means simple, but here a commander receives actionable instructions, assigned resources 
and previous doctrine resulting in planned tactical actions. 
3. The Operational Level of War 
The operational level of war is the intermediate level between strategy and tactics.  
At this level, military staffs translate strategic goals and objectives into an actionable 
operations framework, task organization and written orders.  The operational level 
bridges the abstraction of strategy and the mechanical action of tactics (Naveh, 1997).  
Activities associated with the operational level normally occur on higher military 
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the military staff’s creativity and intellect known as operational art to create an 
operational design.  This operational design is the framework that translates strategic 
goals into concrete actionable objectives and orders.  This mental model is present in the 
black box functional decomposition of the operational level of war in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.   Black Box Functional Decomposition of Operational Level of War 
The strategic goals, assigned resources and varying signals constitute the inputs to 
the operational level of war.  Strategic goals and objectives maybe tied to a physical 
system, such as maintaining a border from an invading force, but historically are often 
more abstract and open for interpretation.  National leadership should define a range of 
material resources assigned to a particular strategic policy and/or goals, but resource 
allocation often requires a dialogue that progresses as the operational design is 
formulated.  Finally, signals influencing activities at the operational level of war are too 
numerous to model here.  Commanders and staffs conducting operational planning need 
to be aware of signals originating on a strategic level such as world opinion to signals 
residing in the tactical arena such as the opinion of local villagers.  Both different types 
of signals may be crucial to understanding the operational environment and possible 
solution.  The outputs from the operational level of war focus on the physical mechanical 
world and include the operational design, task organization and military orders for 
subordinate units.  These outputs give concrete direction that drive action.  If one 
considers all the levels of war as one system, it is at this point that the system’s operation 
now passes from the abstract to the physical (Naveh, 1997).  If one considers all the 
activities occurring at the operational level of war as a single system, then it is this 












plan.  This differs from the strategic and tactical system models, where both inputs and 
outputs are of a similar nature, either abstract or physical. 
C. GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY APPLIED TO THE OPERATIONAL 
LEVEL OF WAR 
After presenting each level of war as a black box decomposition model and 
describing the differences in each, this thesis focuses now on the operational level of war.  
In particular, this thesis builds upon the work of Shimon Naveh as presented in his book 
In Pursuit of Military Excellence, the Evolution of Operational Theory that applies the 
General System Theory to the operational level of war (Naveh, 1997).  The purpose of 
this application of the General Systems Theory is to establish the operational level of war 
as a complex open system thus allowing the introduction of systems principles and 
architecting to support an overall operational planning framework theory.  Once the 
theory is established, it is used as the basis for evaluation of current military planning 
doctrine in Chapters III and IV as well as the operational planning framework proposal in 
Chapter V. 
1. General System Theory 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy presented the General System Theory in his book entitled 
General System Theory, Foundations, Development, Applications (Bertalanffy, 1968).  
He defined a system as “a set of elements standing in interrelations” (Bertalanffy, 1968).  
He also details that the number of elements, the type of elements and their relations create 
a system and its complexity.  The relations have their own defining characteristic.  
Namely, systems relations exhibit a non-linear property, support the system’s overall 
purpose and reflect a tension between the system’s abstract purpose and assigned 
mechanical actions occurring at the subsystem level (Naveh, 1997).  Naveh describes this 
last relation characteristic as “moving the system from a state of abstract, cognitive 
commonality to a practical course of positive progress” by “translating the overall aim 
into the concrete objectives and missions for the system’s individual components” 
(Naveh, 1997).  Bertalanffy theorized “there exist models, principles, and laws that apply 
to generalized systems of their particular kind, the nature of their component elements, 
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and the relations or “forces” between them” (Bertlalanffy, 1968).  Benjamin S. Blanchard 
and Wolter J. Fabrycky discuss the General System Theory in their book Systems 
Engineering and Analysis writing that “General systems theory is concerned with 
developing a systematic framework for describing general relationships in the natural and 
the human-made world” (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006).  Thus, the General System 
Theory attempts to define and understand a system by applying general insights and 
lessons learned from studying various systems across disciplines. 
2. Operational Level of War as a System 
The most detailed application of the General System Theory to the operational 
level of war is presented by Shimon Naveh.  He applies system and interaction 
characteristics described by the General System Theory to the operational level of war, 
establishing it as a system requiring a systems perspective for adequate analysis.  
According to Naveh (Naveh, 1997): 
• The operational level of war is an open system, interacting with its 
environment. 
• The fighting mass constitutes the system elements. 
• Maneuver provides the interaction among elements. 
Maneuver as the medium for interaction, exhibits the characteristics of element relations 
described in the General System Theory.  At the operational level of war: 
• The effects of maneuver on military operations are nonlinear. 
• The operational framework formulated from strategic goals and missions 
drives the maneuver of different military elements. 
• All element maneuvers must perform mechanical tactical actions directed 
by operational framework focused on achieving the abstract strategic 
goals.  Therefore, “in a military context, this dichotomy requires the 
preservation of a controlled disequilibrium between the general aim and 
the specific missions.” (Naveh, 1997) 
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In essence, Naveh concludes that the activities occurring at the operational level of war 
translating abstract strategy to mechanical tactical actions constitute a system as 
described by the General System Theory.  Therefore, to adequately conduct and 
coordinate all operational activities or study operational art, a framework based on 
systems principles and experience is required. 
D. FOUNDATIONS OF SYSTEMS ARCHITECTING APPLIED TO THE 
OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR 
Chapter II of this thesis has established that: 
• The operational level of war differs from the strategic and tactical because 
it receives abstract strategic guidance but produces mechanical tactical 
direction. 
• All activities that occur at the operational level of war constitute “the 
implementation of the universal system in the military sphere” (Naveh, 
1997). 
The next step is to establish a framework that guides the study of military operations and 
is useful for the development and critique of doctrine related to the planning of military 
operations.  American military doctrine describes operational activities as requiring both 
elements of art and science (MCDP 1, 1997).  Therefore, a foundational operational 
framework must incorporate and merge artistic and scientific elements to translate 
abstract strategy into tactical orders and directions.  As established in Chapter I, 
American military doctrine is well equipped to handle the scientific elements of 
operational planning but lacks the processes to apply artistic creativity to the operational 
level of war.  This doctrinal gap provided the impetus for General Mattis’ challenge to 
incorporate design into operational planning doctrine (USJFCOM, 2009).  However, 
before a process can be changed or revised, a new relationship paradigm is needed that 
effectively provides for the application of both art and science to operational planning 




architect, builder, and customer model provides a rich metaphor for the application of art 
and science to the operational level of war as well as providing insight into the dynamics 
of stakeholder relationships and interactions. 
The architect, builder, and customer model originated in ancient times, and its 
application has recently proven useful for the design of organizations and technology 
oriented systems.  Mark W. Maier and Eberhardt Rechtin, in their book entitled The Art 
of Systems Architecting, describe this model and its application to systems other than 
traditional civil projects.  They describe two distinct activities that occur, architecting and 
engineering:   
Generally speaking, engineering deals almost entirely with measureables 
using analytic tools derived from mathematics and the hard sciences; that 
is, engineering is a deductive process.  Architecting deals largely with 
unmeasurables using nonquantitative tools and guidelines based on 
practical lessons learned; that is, architecting is an inductive process.   At a 
more detailed level, engineering is concerned with quantifiable costs, 
architecting with qualitative worth.  Engineering aims for technical 
optimization, architecting for client satisfaction.  Engineering is more a 
science, architecting more of an art.  (Maier & Rechtin, 2002) 
In a military context, design represents architecting and scientific-based planning 
doctrine represents engineering as referred to by Maier and Rechtin.  To cope effectively 
with the operational level of war, doctrine must consist of operational architecting, 
operational planning and mechanisms that facilitate a seamless communication and 
transition between the two.  For the remainder of this thesis, the author redefines design 
as operational architecting which is a systems approach that attempts to translate strategic 
guidance into an operational design as defined in Chapter I.  This operational design then 
becomes the basis for operational planning executed by the classical military planning 
process.  Doctrine must include the two separate but equal activities of architecting and 
planning into one seamless scalable process.  Current doctrine copes well with 
operational planning but is woefully insufficient to cope with operational architecting.  In 
order to correct this doctrine gap, the American military must first recognize the need for 
operational architecting and establish a theoretical framework for its development and 
interaction with operational planning.  Operational architecting encompasses all 
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operational art activities used to create the operational design that represents the 
environment, situation and concept of solution from a systems perspective.  The 
operational design then becomes the blueprint for all operational planning activities that 
produces detailed military orders resulting in tactical action. This thesis proposes that the 
development of operational architecting be built upon the foundations of systems 
architecting.  Maier and Rechtin describe the foundations of systems architecting as a 
systems approach, a purpose orientation, a modeling methodology, ultraquality 
implementation, certification and insights and heuristics (Maier & Rechtin, 2002).  The 
following paragraphs apply the foundations of systems architecting to the operational 
level of war and explore the architecting metaphor in relation to operational stakeholders. 
1. A Systems Approach 
Maier and Rechtin describe the systems approach as “one that focuses on the 
system as a whole, particularly when making value judgments (what is required) and 
design decisions (what is feasible)” (Maier & Rechtin, 2002).  Earlier in Chapter II, this 
thesis described the operational level of war as an application of the General System 
Theory to warfare (Naveh, 1997).  Operational architecting then must focus on the 
operational level of war as a complete system, seeking to understand the environment, the 
situation, what is required and what is feasible.  Also hidden in the system approach is the 
requirement to have a shared understanding of the operational system under 
consideration.  This common understanding must be shared between both strategic and 
operational leadership levels ensuring unity of thought and understanding of the strategic 
purpose. 
2. A Purpose Orientation 
Just as in systems architecting, operational architecting must be “a process driven 
by a client’s purpose or purposes, (Maier & Rechtin, 2002).  The purpose of operational 
architecting is to fulfill strategic direction and guidance.  The entire purpose of the 
operational system is to translate abstract guidance into mechanical tactical direction.  
Operational architecting must continually ensure that operational planning directs tactical 
actions that fit into an operational framework fulfilling the strategic purpose.  The 
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strategic purpose is the driving force for military action and must be reflected in all 
operational activities.  A clear understanding of the strategic purpose is also predicated on 
a common understanding of the current situation and system.  As in the systems 
approach, the shared mental picture is a crucial requirement to fulfilling the strategic 
purpose. 
3. A Modeling Methodology 
Modeling is the centerpiece of systems architecting—a mechanism of 
communication to clients and builders, of design management with 
engineers and designers, of maintaining systems integrity with project 
management, and of learning for the architect personally. (Maier & 
Rechtin, 2002) 
Modeling is crucial for operational architecting, just as for systems architecting.  
Models of the military environment and situation are the tools that establish a shared 
mental model among all stakeholders.  Operational architecting processes do not need to 
establish a model template only require that models are created and distributed to all 
stakeholders.  These models ensure unity of thought and a shared mental model thus 
ensuring an accurate understanding of the strategic purpose and overall system.  Models 
are the vehicles that also promote learning among all stakeholders especially when the 
environment or system changes unexpectedly (Maier & Rechtin, 2002).       
4. Ultraquality Implementation 
“Ultraquality is defined as a level of quality so demanding that it is impractical to 
measure defects, much less certify the system prior to use” (Maier & Rechtin, 2002).  At 
first glance, one might assume that this principle does not apply to a military system.  
However, the principle of striving for a quality solution is very applicable.  Operational 
architecting must strive for perfection knowing it is unobtainable, a system model can 
never be totally accurate and a solution never optimized.  Military professionals are 
required to strive for quality so demanding that only full solution implementation reveals 
the deficiencies especially as the system evolves and changes in response to the injection 
of the operational solution.  The concept of ultraquality implement also infers that in a 
traditional sense, validation of an operational architecture prior to certification may not 
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be possible.  The true validation of the system occurs only after strategic leadership has 
certified it for use and it is fully implemented.  Therefore, the validation of the first 
iteration occurs during planning for follow on operational designs.  
5. Certification 
In systems architecting, certification is the “formal statement by the architect to 
the client or user that the system, as built, meets the criteria both for client acceptance and 
for builder receipt of payment, i.e., it is ready for use (to fulfill its purposes)” (Maier & 
Rechtin, 2002).  Certification for operational architects occurs when strategic and 
operational leadership share a common understanding of the military situation and 
solution and how strategic guidance will be satisfied.  Leadership then certifies the 
operational framework for implementation.  For military operations, certification will 
occur at both operational and strategic levels.  The principle however, is that the 
appropriate level of command certifies the work of the operational architect and agrees 
with the common situation and solution models thus allowing the planners to begin work 
on engineering the corresponding campaign or operation.   
6. Insights and Heuristics 
It is widely acknowledged that successful military commanders often exercise 
great insight into military matters, whether from experience, study or ability.  The same is 
true for operational architects.  The situations, environment and stakeholders that 
constitute the military area of operations are so complex, analytical methods alone are 
inadequate.  Oftentimes, the only tool available to the operational architect will be 
insight.  Maier and Rechtin define insight as “the ability to structure a complex situation 
in a way that greatly increases understanding of it” and “is strongly guided by lessons 
learned from one’s own or others’ experiences and observations” (Maier & Rechtin, 
2002).  Therefore, it is incumbent upon doctrine to capture operational insights into 
heuristics, “succinct expressions” that express the meaning of lessons learned (Maier & 
Rechtin, 2002).  These heuristics will serve as tool kit to assist the operational architect 
during all phases of the operation and campaign.  Many found in systems architecting are 
directly applicable to military operations, others will have to be created over time through 
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study of military campaigns from an operational architecting framework.  Either way, 
operational heuristics need to be collected and understood in order to serve as an integral 
tool for the operational architect. 
7. Architecting Metaphor Applied to Operational Stakeholders  
The architect, builder and customer model not only applies art and science to the 
planning of military operations but greatly assists in clarifying relations between 
stakeholders in the operational context.  In an attempt to understand roles and 
responsibilities, it is advisable for operational architects to list all stakeholders and assign 
a role in the architect, builder, and customer model.  Among the most important are the 
client, architect, project manager, technical artisan, user, neighbor, and stock holder.  The 
list is actually only limited by the imagination.  Once roles are assigned, relationships and 
dynamics will become much clearer.  It also helps to determine whose value judgments 
matter.  As a case in point, the local populace is not a client of the military commander 
but their value judgment is paramount.  System learning is definitely facilitated by 
understanding stakeholders and their relationships according to a commonly understood 
model.  A planning process should not mandate a template for stakeholder analysis; only 
provide examples and heuristics for the architecting team. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The American doctrinal description of the operational level of war encompasses 
the activities that translate strategic guidance to mechanical tactical action.  According to 
Shimon Naveh, the operational level war constitutes a system as described by Ludwig 
Bertalanffy’s General System Theory.  Accordingly, it requires a systems-based approach 
for understanding, planning and execution.  Present doctrine acknowledges this systems-
based approach but uses only scientific planning processes to meet the challenge 
presented by the complexity of the military operations sphere.  American military 
planning doctrine neglects to include any process that would apply artistic creativity to 
the operational level of war, leaving planning staffs to their own abilities and ideas.  
Recently, senior military leadership identified the doctrine deficiency and tasked different 
organizations with establishing a more comprehensive planning process that applies the 
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art and science to the operational level of war (indicated in Chapter I).  The thrust of 
Chapter II described this thesis’ foundational theory for operational planning based upon 
the premise that the operational level of war is a system as defined by the General System 
Theory and that elements of art and science are required to adequately cope with the 
complexity of military operations.  As a result, Chapter II concluded that any operational 
planning process should: 
• Be built upon the architect, builder and customer model 
• Utilize the separate but equal activities of operational architecting 
(analogous to design) and operational planning. 
• Utilize current military decision making processes for operational 
planning. 
• Utilize the foundations of systems architecting to develop doctrine and 
processes for operational architecting. 
• Provide for the seamless communication and interaction between 
architecting and planning activities. 
Chapters III and IV will evaluate present day operational planning doctrine’s 
fulfillment of senior level direction to incorporate design and compliance with the 
theoretical points summarized above.  Chapter V will present an alternate planning 
process founded on the theory established in Chapter II as well as from concepts found in 
business design, RSE and best practices from system architects.  Finally, Chapter VI will 
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III. MARINE CORPS PLANNING DOCTRINE AND PROCESSESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
USMC doctrine consists of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs), 
Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs), Marine Corps Regulation 
Publications (MCRPs) and Marine Corps Interim Publications (MCIPs).  MCDPs are the 
highest level of USMC doctrine and consist of two groups; those that describe the 
“enduring beliefs of warfighting” and those that provide the “guiding doctrine for the 
conduct of major warfighting activities” (HQMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat 
Development & Integration, 2011).  The only exception to this is MCDP 1–0 Marine 
Corps Operations, which “translates the philosophical-based capstone/keystone 
publications into operational doctrine” (HQMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat 
Development & Integration, 2011).  MCWPs are one level below and describe specific 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) specific to certain missions or warfighting 
areas.  MCRPs either supplement the MCWPs, containing information that is more 
detailed, or present general reference or historically significant material.  Finally, MCIPs 
capture TTPs learned from recent experiences or research for timely distribution as 
USMC evaluation continues (HQMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development & 
Integration, 2011).  The major publications from the USMC Doctrine Hierarchy that 
describe USMC planning theory and processes are MCDP 1 Warfighting, MCDP 1–0 
Marine Corps Operations, MCDP 5 Planning and MCWP 5–1 Marine Corps Planning 
Process.  Figure 6 graphically displays the relationships and corresponding levels of all 
USMC doctrine related to operational planning. 
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Figure 6.   Planning Doctrine Roadmap (After HQMC Deputy Commandant for Combat 
Development and Integration, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications) 
In order to understand both USMC planning theory and the USMC planning 
process, Chapter III analyzes all publications presented in Figure 6 because no one 
document presents a unified planning theory and process.  MCDP 5 presents a planning 
theory based on the classical decision-making process and the characteristics of a 
successful plan.  MCDP 1 discusses the conceptual role of planning in warfighitng 
whereas MCDP 1–0 attempts to present what planning must do and achieve operationally 
in support of military operations.  MCWP 5–1 describes the USMC process that a 
commander and staff should follow in order to plan a military operation.  Therefore, this 
chapter first summarizes the planning concepts and theory presented in MCDP 1, MCDP 
5 and MCDP 1–0 that together form the intellectual foundation for the MCPP.  Next, this 
chapter discusses the MCPP, establishing how it builds a planning process for USMC 
commanders and staff that is based upon its intellectual underpinnings.  Once the USMC 
planning theory is articulated and the process analyzed, this thesis presents a comparison 
between the USMC planning system and the operational planning framework established 
in Chapter II based on the architect, builder and customer model.  The final objective of 
this chapter is to evaluate the effectiveness of Marine Corps efforts to incorporate the 
concepts and elements of operational design into the MCPP in compliance with General 
Mattis’ Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational Design and to determine if an 
alternative operational planning model is needed. 
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B. MARINE CORPS PLANNING THEORY 
The Marine Corps planning paradigm begins with foundational warfighting 
concepts pertinent to planning which influence planning theory that then become 
operational planning concepts.  This thesis describes the Marine Corps planning 
paradigm using a building block approach focused on MCDP 1, MCDP 5 and MCDP 1–
0.  The first step is to discuss foundational warfighting concepts pertinent to planning 
from MCDP 1.  Next, Marine Corps Planning Theory is analyzed as described in MCDP 
5.  Finally, this thesis discusses how Marine Corps Planning Theory influenced and 
shaped operational planning concepts in MCDP 1–0.  A final consolidate theory requires 
a discussion of all three documents. 
1. MCDP 1 Warfighting 
A military organization’s philosophy of war influences every activity in that 
organization.  In MCDP 1, the USMC presents its war philosophy.  Within that 
philosophy, three elements most influence the Marine Corps Planning Theory (MCDP 1, 
1997): 
• The complexity of war 
• The science and art of war 
• Centrality of the commander. 
MCDP 1 describes war as a “complex phenomenon” (MCDP 1, 1997).  MCDP 1 
continues to explain that “as a result, war is not governed by the actions or decisions of a 
single individual in any one place but emerges from the collective behavior of all the 
individual parts in the system interacting locally in response to local conditions and 
incomplete information” (MCDP 1, 1997).  Describing war as a system that is complex 
because of interactions among its parts, lays the foundation for a systems perspective and 
approach.  In response to MCDP 1, Marine Corps planning theory should also reflect a 
systems perspective because that is how war is described in doctrine.  MCDP 1 continues 
to describe war as encompassing both art and science elements (MCDP 1, 1997).  MCDP 
1 “concludes that the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human 
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competition requiring both the knowledge of science and the creativity of art but driven 
ultimately by the power of human will” (MCDP 1, 1997).  In response to this concept, 
planning theory must cope with the art and science elements associated with conducting 
and planning warfare.  Artistic elements may include novel problem definitions and 
conceptual solutions resulting from a unique grasp of the situation where as the detailed 
planning need to phase forces into a military operations area with limited transportation 
assets is an example of scientific elements in planning.  Planning processes and theory 
must provide mechanisms for operational architecting (artistic elements), operational 
planning (scientific elements) and their interaction.  Finally, MCDP 1 describes the 
centrality of the commander to all warfighting activities (MCDP 1, 1997).  The 
commander is central to the organization structure, planning and action.  Therefore, a 
USMC planning theory must describe his or her lead role in all planning activities.  In 
summary, in order for Marine Corps Planning theory to be consistent with Marine Corps 
warfighting philosophy, Marine Corps Planning theory must: 
• Cope with war as a complex system 
• Apply both art and science to the planning and execution of warfare 
• Establish the commander as the central participant in planning. 
2. MCDP 5 Planning 
The foreword of MCDP 5 explains that the “publication describes the theory and 
philosophy of military planning as practiced by the U.S. Marine Corps” (MCDP 5, 1997).  
MCDP 5 consists of three chapters: chapter 1, The Nature of Planning; Chapter 2, 
Planning Theory; and chapter 3, Planning Effectively.  Chapter 1 defines planning and 
plans as well as general characteristic of the process.  Chapter 3 presents characteristics 
of good plans and the relationship between the commander and planners.  This thesis 
focuses on Chapter 2, as it presents the theory behind the Marine Corps Planning Process.   
After reviewing MCDP 5, the foundational elements of the Marine Corps 
Planning Theory are the classical decision-making process, analysis and synthesis, the 
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centrality of the commander and a tactical focus.  The Marine Corps Planning theory is 
built upon the classical decision making process, as presented in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.   MCDP 5 Planning Process (From MCDP 5, 1997) 
Figure 1 depicts the classical linear decision-making process described in Chapter I of 
this thesis.  This graphic represents different iterations by showing the linear process in a 
cycle.  This process is used to manage both analysis and synthesis activities.  MCDP 5 
defines analysis as “the systematic process of studying a subject by successively 
decomposing the subject into parts and dealing with each of the parts in turn” (MCDP 5, 
1997) and synthesis as the “creative process of integrating elements into a cohesive 
whole” (MCDP 5, 1997).  Therefore, MCDP 5 describes the science of war as analysis 
and the art of war as synthesis.  To translate the concepts of analysis and synthesis to 
actual activities, MCDP 5 relates these concepts to actual activities mapped as the 
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hierarchy of planning, consisting of the conceptual, functional and detailed levels.  
Conceptual planning is the highest level of planning primarily requiring synthesis 
activities while detailed planning is at the bottom of the hierarchy, primarily requiring 
analysis activities.  Functional planning is the middle level requiring elements of art and 
science.  According to Marine Corps planning theory, the higher levels of the planning 
hierarchy require more synthesis where as lower levels require more analysis (MCDP 5, 
1997).  Figure 8 presents the Marine Corps planning hierarchy. 
 
Figure 8.   MCDP 5 Planning Hierarchy (From MCDP 5, 1997) 
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Central to the planning hierarchy and the application of art and science, is the role 
of the commander.  Marine Corps planning theory centers on the commander.  He or she 
is primarily responsible for conceptual planning while functional and detailed planning 
activities are delegated to the staff (MCDP 5, 1997).  Therefore, according to theory, one 
could easily infer that the commander focuses on the art of war and the staff focuses on 
the science of war.  Finally, Marine Corps Planning theory focuses on the tactical level.  
The introduction explains, “The focus here is on operation planning, especially at the 
tactical level” (MCDP 5, 1997).  Overall, MCDP 5 does not elaborate on all MCDP 1 
warfighting concepts related to planning.  MCDP 5 does attempt to apply both art and 
science to warfare and establish the commander as the central figure, but fails to 
articulate a theoretical framework that copes with operational war as a complex system.  
These shortcomings carry over to MCDP 1–0. 
3. MCDP 1–0 Marine Corps Operations 
MCDP 1–0 “represents how our warfighting philosophy is codified in operational 
terms” and “is the transition-the bridge-between the Marine Corps’ warfighting 
philosophy of maneuver warfare to the TTP used by Marines” (MCDP 1–0, 2001).  For 
the Marine Corps, MCDP 1–0 is part theory and part operational.  It is important to 
analyze this document as it is the step from planning theory presented in MCDP 1 and 5 
to the planning process presented in MCWP 5–1.   
MCDP 1–0 translates planning theory into more operational specifics by 
codifying the central role of the commander and summarizing the planning hierarchy.  
MCDP 1–0 follows suit with MCDP 5 and delegates most of conceptual planning and the 
artistic elements of war to the commander.  This is codified in what MCDP 1–0 describes 
as the operational design.  MCDP 1–0 uses this term differently than defined by JP 1-02.  
MCDP 1–0 defines operational design as “the commander’s tool for translating the 
operational requirements of his superiors into the tactical guidance needed by his 
subordinate commanders and staff.  The commander uses his operational design to 
visualize, describe, and direct those actions necessary to achieve his desired end state and 
accomplish his assigned mission.  The operational design includes the purpose of the 
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operation, what the commander wants to accomplish, the desired effects on the enemy, 
and how he envisions achieving a decision” (MCDP 1–0, 2001)  In essence, MCDP 1–0 
requires the commander to apply the art of war in order to understand the environment, 
situation and conceptual solution alone without staff assistance.  MCDP 1–0 describes the 
commander as the lone conceptual planner with the details left for the staff.  In practice, 
commanders do not perform all conceptual planning alone and most likely the 
commander’s staff is involved from the beginning.  However, if the Marine Corps 
followed its doctrine closely, the commander would essentially frame the environment, 
situation and conceptual solution almost entirely alone. 
4. Summary 
In summary, Marine Corps Planning Theory focuses on the classical decision 
model, the central role of the commander in planning, and applying the art and science of 
warfare to planning.  MCDP 1 describes war as a complex system but neither MCDP 5 
nor MCDP 1–0 expands this concept.  The Marine Corps planning theory focuses on the 
commander’s application of the art of war and the staff’s application of the science of 
war within the context of the classic decision making model.  MCWP 5–1 develops this 
overarching theme into an operational planning process. 
C. MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS 
MCWP 5–1 Marine Corps Planning Process was published on August 24, 2010 
and consists of six steps; Problem Framing, Course of Action (COA) Development, COA 
Wargaming, COA Comparison and Decision, Orders Development and Transition.  The 
2010 edition represents the Marine Corps’ effort to respond to General Mattis’ direction 
and incorporate design into the traditional process.  The most substantial change from 
earlier editions occurred in the first step of Problem Framing and is discussed in detail.  
The remaining steps represent the classical decision making process and have been 
unchanged from the original edition.  Figure 9 presents the MCPP graphically. 
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Figure 9.   Overview of the Marine Corps Planning Process  
(From MCWP 5–1, 2010) 
1. Problem Framing 
According to MCWP 5–1, “problem framing enhances understanding of the 
environment and the nature of the problem.  It identifies what the command must 
accomplish, when and where it must be done and, most importantly, why-the purpose of 
the operation” (MCWP 5–1, 2010).  Figure 10 graphically shows the injects, activities, 
and results for the Problem Framing step. 
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Figure 10.   Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Problem Framing  
(From MCWP 5–1. 2010) 
The injects to the problem framing step include any relevant situational information, 
guidance from higher headquarters, outside research, knowledge and judgment of the 
commander and his staff and finally any planning confirmation briefs received.  The 
commander and staff then uses these inputs to conduct the problem framing activities.  
These activities focus on open dialogue concerning the problem under the banner of 
design and more traditional mission analysis activities such as center of gravity analysis 
and task analysis.  Finally, the commander and staff produce a problem framing brief that 
includes traditional planning products such as a tasks list, centers of gravity, a mission 
statement and a warning order instructing subordinate units to begin planning.  However, 
no design or problem model is required before moving on in the planning process. 
Originally, the first step of the MCPP was Mission Analysis.  The 2010 edition of 
the MCPP changed the first step to Problem Framing with new orientation on dialogue 
and discussion between the commander and staff.  The first step of MCPP recommends 
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dialogue and discussion in design activities.  However, the commander is still responsible 
for the commander’s initial intent and guidance (MCWP 5–1, 2010).  Once the design 
activities are finished, the remaining activities may be classified as staff and ongoing 
activities and constitute functional and detailed planning.  The major change in the 2010 
MCPP is the staff’s inclusion in conceptual planning, described as design activities.  
However, after that dialogue there are no outputs required.  The discussion and work is 
solely for the benefit of the commander and his mental model.  Models of the 
environment, situation and conceptual solution are not required.  The output requirements 
are listed in the results section of Figure 10.  These outputs are focused on providing 
input to the next step and not a true understanding of the operational level of war as a 
system.  After the Problem Framing step, the MCPP does not encourage the application 
of creative art but becomes mechanical actions based on the classical decision making 
process focused on producing tactical orders. 
2. Summary 
Overall, the MCPP reflects most elements of Marine Corps planning theory.  It 
maintains the central role of the commander in the conceptual planning but only focuses 
on applying creative art to the operational plan in the first step of the process.  The 
remaining steps mechanically focus on producing tactical orders.  The MCPP is based 
metaphorically on an assembly line.  The goal is production of a product not necessarily 
on understanding a complex system. 
D. COMPARISON BETWEEN MCPP AND THE ARCHITECT, BUILDER 
AND CUSTOMER MODEL 
Major differences exist between the MCPP and the planning theory present in 
Chapter I.  First, the Marine Corps planning theory and process is established on a 
production metaphor (classical decision-making model) vice a relationship metaphor 
(architect, builder, and customer model).  This tends to make tactical orders the goal vice 
system understanding.  The MCPP, by utilizing the production metaphor, misses the 
richness afforded by the architect, builder, and customer model when analyzing 
stakeholders and their interactions.  The MCPP also focuses primarily on operational 
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planning and makes little effort to incorporate operational architecting.  The only 
architecting activities occur in the Problem Framing step of MCPP but mostly in an 
informal manner.  MCPP is also not system oriented nor presents a modeling 
methodology.  The theory articulates a systems approach but the actual process does not 
follow a systems approach and no shared mental models are constructed and distributed 
to senior and subordinate commands.  Discussions of the environment and situation are 
informal and result in no tangible product.  MCPP does well managing the operational 
planning activities required to generate tactical orders.  However, good planning cannot 
compensate for bad or missing architecture. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Marine Corps Planning Theory and Process are based upon the classic 
commander centric decision-making process, and tackle the activities associated with the 
science of war very well.  The Marine Corps’ theory stresses that war is a complex 
system but the process has no means of coping with the operational level of war from a 
systems approach.  The MCPP focuses on producing tactical orders but not system 
understanding.  The process does not provide mechanisms to conduct operational 
architecting and translate those ideas to operational planning.  The MCPP allocates very 
little effort understanding the environment, situation and conceptual solution but focuses 
on producing an optimal solution and the required tactical orders.  During the process, the 
preponderance of effort (steps two through five) deals with the details of the solution.  
The Marine Corps Planning Theory and Process provide well for planning at the tactical 
level where the system is easily understood from experience or previous study.  However, 
it is at the higher levels where its weaknesses come out.  The MCPP lacks robust tools 
and applications for creating an operational architecture.  Thus, even the most well 
crafted plans can fail because they solve the wrong problem.  Overall, the MCPP fails to 
integrate the creative art into operational planning.  The author believes another planning 





IV. JOINT AND U.S. ARMY PLANNING DOCTRINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2010, the author of this thesis reported to the United States 
Marine Corps Command and Staff College.  The curriculum consisted of three blocks of 
instruction: operational art, cultural and interagency operations and warfighting.  The 
curriculum also included numerous planning exercises designed to provide the students 
hands on training in the Marine Corps Planning Process and an opportunity to incorporate 
lessons learned from the other blocks of instruction.  During this year at USMC 
Command and Staff College, the author was first exposed to operational design and the 
Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational Design published by General Mattis in 
October 2009.  Since that time, the USMC published a revised MCWP 5–1 that was 
discussed in Chapter III.  This revision did little to incorporate operational design, 
making only minor changes to the previous document and process.  The joint community 
and U.S. Army in comparison have made much more progress incorporating operational 
design into their planning theory and processes.  Chapter IV will survey the latest 
publications describing joint and U.S. Army planning in order to briefly describe their 
respective processes and compare those processes to the MCPP and the planning theory 
presented in Chapter II.  This survey and these comparisons will assist the reader in 
further understanding the need behind specific aspects of the alternate planning model 
presented in Chapter V.   
B. JOINT PUBLICATION 5-0, JOINT OPERATION PLANNING 
The preface of JP 5-0 explains that “Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation 
Planning, reflects current guidance for planning military operations and, as a keystone 
publication, forms the core of joint doctrine for joint operation planning throughout the 
range of military operations” (JP 5-0, 2011).  JP 5-0 is the definitive document for joint 
operation planning for the United States military (JP 5-0, 2011).  The 2011 edition of JP 
5-0 contains major revisions in relation to design from the edition released in December 
2006 (JP 5-0, 2011) and is the topic of analysis for this section. 
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1. Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions and Products 
“Joint operation planning encompasses a number of elements, including three 
broad operational activities, planning functions and a number of related products” (JP 5-
0, 2011).  Figure 11 presents an overview of the operational activities, planning functions 
and associated planning products that constitute the joint operation planning. 
 
Figure 11.   Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products  
(From JP 5-0, 2011) 
Three joint operational activities form the beginnings of joint operation planning.  
Situational Awareness defines the first operational activity and includes all “procedures 
for describing the operational environment, including threats to national security” (JP 5-
0, 2011).  For commanders and staff, activities establishing situational awareness are 
wide-ranging and continuous as the commander struggles to understand the assigned 
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environment.  The next operational activity, planning, “translates strategic guidance and 
direction into campaign plans, contingency plans, and operation orders (OPORDS)” (JP 
5-0, 2011).  In a joint environment, planning usually is conducted in response to either 
received national strategic direction or in anticipation of questions from strategic 
leadership based on world events.  According to JP 5-0, planning consists of the broad 
four functions presented in Figure 11; strategic guidance, concept development, plan 
development and plan assessment.  Design and the Joint Operation Planning Process 
(JOPP) are the two distinct types of activities used by the commander and staff during 
each planning function to produce the associated planning products for review and 
execution as presented in Figure 11.  Table 1 lists each planning function, the purpose, 
the primary output and the corresponding activity whether it be design, JOPP or a 
















Planning Function Purpose Output Activity 
Strategic 
Guidance 
Ensure all stakeholders 
understand strategic 
guidance and way 
ahead 
1.  Agreed upon list of assumptions 
used for this planning function 
 2.  Conclusions about “nature of 
problem” (JP 5-0, 2011)  
3.  Strategic and military end states 





courses of action 
(COAs) for review and 
receive approval for 
one COA development 
  “COA  approved for further 
development” (JP 5-0, 2011)  
Design and JOPP 
as appropriate 
Plan Development Develop a complete 
plan based on approved 
COA 
 Approved Plan or Order JOPP 
Plan Assessment Commander 
continually assess  
environment and plan 
to determine if plan 
should be refined, 
adapted, terminated, or 
executed.  
1.  Refined plan (minor changes) 
2.  Adapted plan (major changes) 
3.  Plan terminated 
4.  Plan executed  
Design and JOPP 
as appropriate 
Table 1.   Description of Joint Planning Functions (After JP 5-0, 2011) 
Finally, the last operational activity is execution and execution “begins when the 
President decides to use a military option to resolve a crisis” (JP 5-0, 2011).   
2. Design and JOPP 
The following quote from JP 5-0 describes exactly the required interaction 
between operational art, operational design and JOPP in order to accomplish joint 
operation planning. 
The JFC (Joint Force Commander) and staff develop plans and orders 
through the application of operational art and operational design and by 
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using JOPP.  They combine art and science to develop products that 
describe how (ways) the joint force will employ its capabilities (means) to 
achieve the military end state (ends).  The interaction of operational art 
and operational design provides a bridge between strategy and tactics, 
linking national strategic aims to tactical combat and noncombat 
operations that must be executed to accomplish these aims. (JP 5-0, 2011) 
JP 5-0 advocates the use of two distinct processes to accomplish joint planning, design 
and JOPP.  JP 5-0 never offers a definition of design but functionally defines design as 
the use of operational art to produce an operational design (JP 5-0, 2011).  This is also in 
line with the definition from FM 5-0 that defines design as the “methodology for 
applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-
structured problems and develop approaches to solve them” (FM 5-0, 2010).  According 
to JP 5-0, the design activity produces an operational design, which is “the conception 
and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and 
it subsequent execution” (JP 1-02, 2010).  The operational design must (JP 5-0, 2011): 
• Understand the strategic direction.  (What are the strategic goals to be 
achieved and the military objective that support their attainment?) 
• Understand the operational environment.  (What is the larger context that 
will help me determine our problem?) 
• Define the problem. (What problem is the design intended to solve?) 
• Develop an operational approach. 
The operational approach is the key element of the operational design that is then 
developed through application of the JOPP into an actionable order or plan.  JP 5-0 
concludes its description of the design activity by offering suggested elements that can 
be used within the operational design “to develop and refine the commander’s 
operational approach” (JP 5-0, 2011).  Figure 12 lists the elements of operational design. 
 42 
 
Figure 12.   Elements of Operational Design (From JP 5-0, 2011) 
A definition of each element is not necessary in this thesis, but it is worth noting that the 
elements are not tied to a planning theory or process, but are generally a collective list of 
ideas and tools used during American military planning for years.  It is possible that these 
elements are simply a holdover from previous doctrine and constitute a list of tools 
familiar to most military planners.  
The second distinct process used by JP 5-0 to accomplish joint operation planning 
is JOPP.  It is defined as “an orderly, analytical process, which consists of a set of logical 
steps to examine a mission; develop analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the 
best COA; and produce a plan or order” (JP 5-0, 2011).  Figure 13 presents the JOPP. 
 
Figure 13.   Joint Operation Planning Process (From JP 5-0, 2011) 
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JOPP is modeled after the classical decision making process and remains 
unchanged from the previous edition of JP 5-0 issued in December 2006.  Finally, Figure 
14 graphically represents the interaction between operational art and detailed planning 
activities used during joint operation planning. 
 
Figure 14.   Operational Art and Planning Continuum (From JP 5-0, 2011) 
This graphic is similar to the Design-Planning Continuum present in Chapter I 
from John Schmitt (Schmitt, 2006).  Even though not listed in Figure 14, operational art 
occurs during Design whereas detailed planning is accomplished by application of the 
JOPP.  Figure 14 shows graphically the level of effort invested in either Design or JOPP 
based on the complexity and structure of the problem.  When the problem is less 
structured and ill-defined, design is required to understand the strategic guidance, the 
environment, the problem and develop an operational approach that then becomes the 
basis for the JOPP.  However, if the problem is well understood and relatively well 
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structured, commanders may focus most efforts on the immediate application of the 
JOPP.  Figure 14 demonstrates the scalable quality of the doctrine described in JP 5-0.  A 
commander, based on his unique situation, is encouraged to use doctrine, not as checklist, 
but as a guide to plan and manage joint operations. 
3. Critique of JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning 
Overall, JP 5-0 makes tremendous strides in correctly incorporating design into 
the traditional planning process.  Joint operation planning as described in JP 5-0 is 
conducted through a combination of design and JOPP.  Design roughly equates to the 
operational architecting activity presented in Chapter II and JOPP performs the role of 
detailed operational planning.  JP 5-0 design activities incorporate some of the elements 
of operational architecting discussed in Chapter II, mainly a systems approach, a purpose 
orientation, a modeling methodology and certification.   
Even though not explicitly built upon a systems approach, JP 5-0 does employ 
systems concepts.  It seeks to approach the operational level of war as a complete system 
attempting to collectively understand strategic direction, the operational environment, the 
problem and develop an operational approach (JP 5-0, 2011).  Design as described in JP 
5-0 seeks to establish and communicate a shared understanding of the system and 
proposed solution.  This is also facilitated by the In Progress Reviews (IPRs) with the 
joint commander and strategic leadership, graphically displayed in Figure 11.  Along with 
a systems approach, these IPRs ensure a purpose orientation.  The planning process 
outlined in JP 5-0 definitely ensures that the system model, conceptual solution and 
detailed plan is consistently reviewed and approved by strategic leadership.  Mechanisms 
put in place by JP 5-0 should ensure the joint commander and national civilian leadership 
collectively agree on the problem to be solved and the proposed solution.  Also, the IPRs 
and design activities described in JP 5-0 required the production and communication of 
models.  The commander and staff are required to communicate at each point in the 
process their understanding of the strategic guidance, a proposed solution, detail plan and 
assessment.  These activities have to include the production of mental models that will be 
approved by the commander, communicated and either rejected or accepted by strategic 
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leadership.  This dialogue is very similar to the dialogue between the customer, architect 
and builder.  Metaphorically depending on the planning activity, the commander plays 
both the role of the architect and builder communicating the design and detailed plans to 
the customer, strategic leadership.  Finally, the process described in JP 5-0 includes 
 
certification.  JP 5-0 provides a prescribed process for the commander to certify his or her 
operational design and detailed operational plan to strategic leadership.  Execution then is 
a decision of the President alone.   
JP 5-0 also has multiple strengths over the USMC planning theory and process.  
First, JP 5-0 treats design as a distinct activity from detailed operational planning where 
as the MCPP attempts to incorporate design as an additional step to the traditional 
planning process.  JP 5-0 is much clearer on what is required during design, offers 
different tools to assist the commander and the staff, and clearly delineates how detailed 
operational planning builds upon the operational design and approach.  The MCPP is 
very vague, only encouraging a discussion on the environment and conceptual solution, 
never requiring models or offering tools to assist during design.  Finally, while both JP 5-
0 and MCPP are both commander centric, JP 5-0 is explicit that “operational design 
requires the commander to encourage discourse and leverage dialogue and collaboration 
to identify and solve complex, ill-defined problems” (JP 5-0, 2011).  JP 5-0 clearly 
defines the need for a group approach led by the commander where as USMC planning 
theory almost discounts staff input during conceptual planning. 
C. FIELD MANUAL 5-0 THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 
FM 5-0 “constitutes the Army’s view on planning, preparing, executing and 
assessing operations” (FM 5-0, 2011).  In one manual, the U.S. Army describes its 
operations process as consisting of plan, prepare, execute, and assess with planning as a 
sub-element to that process.  FM 5-0 describes planning “as the art and science of 
understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of 
bringing that future about” (FM 5-0, 2011).  FM 5-0 continues to explain the need for 
design and the military decision making process (MDMP) during conceptual planning to 
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understand the environment, frame the problem, define an end state and develop an 
operation approach.  Detailed planning through continued application of the MDMP then 
translates the operational approach into a fully developed operational plan (FM 5-0, 
2011).  The quote below from FM 5-0 summarizes the interaction between design and 
detailed planning. 
Planning consists of two separate, but closely related components: a 
conceptual component and a detailed component.  The conceptual 
component is represented by the cognitive application of design.  The 
detailed component translates broad concepts into a complete and practical 
plan. (FM 5-0, 2011)   
The design methodology from FM 5-0 is presented in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.   The design methodology (From FM 5-0, 2011) 
This methodology is very similar to the elements of the operational design 
presented in JP 5-0, including a in depth study of the environment, problem and solution.  
The only difference is JP 5-0 incorporates understanding strategic direction as a distinct 
element where as FM 5-0 includes strategic direction and endstate under the 
Environmental frame.  FM 5-0, like JP 5-0, also includes the design concept as an input 
into the MDMP especially for ill-structure problems (FM 5-0, 2011).  Overall, JP 5-0 and 
FM 5-0 both incorporate design as a separate planning activity used primarily to 
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conceptually understand a problem and a solution.  This conceptual understanding is 
captured as either a operational design in JP 5-0 or design concept in FM 5-0 and used as 
the primary input into the standard decision making process.  There are very few 
substantial differences between the design concepts in JP 5-0 and FM 5-0. 
D. CONCLUSION 
JP 5-0 and FM 5-0 have developed a general framework that attempts to 
institutionalize creative imagination by incorporating design into their respective 
planning processes.  Both doctrines functionally articulate design as a planning activity 
that:  
• Provides input to the more analytical classical decision making process 
• Uses a systems approach to analyze ill-structured situations 
• Is guided by a purpose, namely strategic guidance 
• Builds mental models to ensure common understanding with strategic and 
tactical leadership 
• Involves a process of certification from strategic leadership during all 
phases of planning 
The doctrine described in JP 5-0 and FM 5-0 is superior to the MCPP, which includes 
design within the traditional military planning process.  However, the JP 5-0 and FM 5-0 
both have limitations.  Neither doctrine fully prescribes a process model for design.  Both 
JP 5-0 and FM 5-0 prescribe possible tools and characteristics of a good design, but no 
doctrine actually presents a detailed methodology with a sound theoretical backing.  In 
other words, both doctrines make progress toward the goal set out in General Mattis’ 
Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational Design by establishing a general framework 
but lack specific processes and models that guide design execution.  In response, chapter 
V presents an alternate planning model that builds upon the general framework presented 




architect, builder and customer model.  This model, although not complete, provides the 
starting point for research and experimentation for the next stage of design development, 
moving design from a general framework to a solid process model guiding all 
commander and staff planning functions. 
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V. ALTERNATE PLANNING PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of Chapter V is to present an alternative planning process based upon 
the architect, builder and customer model and the foundation of systems architecting:  a 
systems approach, a purpose orientation, a modeling methodology, ultraquality 
implementation, certification and insights and heuristics (Maier & Rechtin, 2002).  The 
alternative planning process attempts to translate strategic guidance into an actionable 
operational plan by combining two distinct activities; operational architecting and 
operational planning.  Figure 16 provides a general model of the proposed alternative 
planning process. 
 
Figure 16.   Overview of Alternative Planning Process  
(After ACQuipedia, 2011) 
The model for the alternative planning process is loosely based on the contemporary 
Department of Defense Systems Engineering Process model (ACQuipedia, 2011).  The 
input into the process is strategic guidance.  The first activity, operational architecting, 
attempts to distill strategic guidance into an operational design.  As presented in 
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Chapter I, this thesis uses the term “operational architecting” in lieu of the term “design” 
and Chapter II presented the theoretical underpinnings for the replacement of terms.  
Those theoretical underpinnings were built upon the foundations of systems architecting 
and the architect, builder customer model.  Chapter II concluded by describing 
operational architecting as the process that encompasses all operational art activities used 
to create the operational design which represents the environment, situation and concept 
of solution from a systems perspective.  The bulk of Chapter V presents a detailed 
operational architecting process that translates strategic guidance into an operational 
design.  Operational planning, the other activity, then builds upon the operational design 
and creates a comprehensive operational plan that directs tactical action to achieve the 
desired strategic end state.  Figure 17 presents a detailed alternative planning process 
model. 
 
Figure 17.   Alternative Planning Process  
(After Langford, 2006; JP 5-0 2011; F-M, 2011)  
The following sections discuss Figure 17 in detail. 
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B. OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTING 
Operational architecting, as defined in Chapter II, encompasses all operational art 
activities used to create the operational design that represents the environment, situation 
and concept of solution from a systems perspective.  The operational design then 
becomes the starting point for operational planning because it is “the framework that 
underpins a campaign or major operation plan” (JP 1-02, 2010).  The alternative planning 
process lays out five distinct activities within operational architecting: stakeholder 
analysis, environmental frame, strategic frame, problem frame and operational approach.  
These results of these five activities collectively become the operational design. 
Operational architecting is built upon the foundation that warfare is essentially a 
social open collaborative system (Maier & Rechtin, 2002).  Warfare is social because the 
primary elements are individuals and their organizations.  Warfare is an open 
collaborative system because no one stakeholder has total “coercive power to run the 
system” (Maier & Rechtin, 2002).  In warfare and international affairs, a successful 
outcome requires sub-social elements in the system to cooperate voluntarily or through 
force with the established American strategic purpose.  Neither national nor military 
leaders exercise total control but ultimately depend on cooperation from other 
stakeholders for successful achievement of American strategic policy.  Since success 
depends on the collaboration of other individuals and organizations, the first step in 
operational architecting is stakeholder analysis. 
1. Stakeholder Analysis 
The receipt of strategic guidance initiates the stakeholder analysis activity.  
Stakeholder Analysis strives to identify, classify and understand the worldview of all 
stakeholders possibly involved in the operational system at the present time and in the 
future (Checkland & Poulter, 2006).  In order to facilitate the most objective perceptions, 
initial stakeholder analysis is performed before formal system definition or strategic 
guidance modeling.  Although conducted first, this activity is constantly updated and 
refined throughout operational architecting. 
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The first goal of stakeholder analysis is identification and classification.  This 
straightforward activity simply lists all possible stakeholders involved in the operational 
system.  The list should include everyone either directly or indirectly involved in the 
operational system.  Examples include American public, national press, strategic 
leadership, military leadership, adversary leadership, local populace, international 
partners, international competitors etc.  Once stakeholders are identified, they should be 
classified according to the architect, builder and customer model.  This model offers a 
rich metaphor into stakeholder roles and interactions.  Usually, the military command 
receiving strategic direction acts as both the architect and builder.  Strategic leadership 
usually plays the role of the customer.  The American public can be considered either 
investors or board leadership to which the customer is responsible.  The user of the 
architecture could possibly be defined as the local populace contained in the operational 
system.  International competitors could be classified as competing organizations for 
attention of the end user.  The metaphor is endless and very valuable to understand roles 
in a social collaborative system.  
The next step is to understand the worldview of all stakeholders in the operational 
system.  The four whos of the current operational system, “who benefits? who pays? who 
provides? and, as appropriate, who loses?” Maier & Rechtin (2002) provide an excellent 
lens for understanding stakeholder worldviews.  This activity also assists in further 
refining role definition within the system.  The four whos should also be reexamined in 
light of the completed operational approach.  Understanding stakeholder reactions to the 
insertion of American national power in the operational system is a key component to 
minimizing unintended consequences.  The ultimate goal of stakeholder analysis is an 
initial objective understanding of the individuals and organizations within the possible 
operational system.  This initial analysis should be as neutral and nonjudgmental as 
possible.  Viewing stakeholders through ill-conceived biases will eventually hinder a 
thoughtful and appropriate operational approach and design. 
 53 
2. Environmental Frame 
After the first attempt at stakeholder analysis, the next step seeks to understand 
and frame the operational environment.  The thesis uses framing “to indicate the process 
of identifying the relevant aspects of the environment and distinguishing them from 
aspects that are not relevant to the operations at hand” (JWFC, 2010).  Establishing the 
environmental frame is the first step of “formulating the mess” (Gharajedaghi, 2006).  
Jamshid Gharajedaghi in Systems Thinking, Managning Chaos and Complexity: A 
platform for designing business architecture states:  
Mess is a system of problems.  It is the future implicit in the present 
behavior of the system, the consequence of the system’s current state of 
affairs.  The essence of the mess is the systemic nature of the situation; it 
is not an aggregate representing the sum of the parts.  The elements of a 
mess are highly interrelated.  No part can be touched without touching the 
other parts.  As such, it is an emergent phenomenon produced by the 
interactions among the parts.  Formulation of the mess, therefore, requires 
understanding the essence of the behavioral characteristics of social 
phenomena.  (Gharajedaghi, 2006) 
It is important to understand the mess of the operational environment constitutes the 
social open collaborative system described earlier in Chapter V.  The mess is primarily 
composed of individuals and/or organizations socially interacting with no one stakeholder 
able to dominate the entire system.  The system exists in every operational setting even 
before the insertion of American national power.  The use of American power through 
the operational approach will require reframing at some point because it will 
fundamentally change the environment.  Gharajedaghi proposes a “three-phase process 
of:  searching, mapping, and telling the story” (Gharajedaghi, 2006). 
“Searching is the iterative examination that generates, information, knowledge, 
and understanding about the system and its environment” (Gharajedaghi, 2006).  In the 
operational architecting sense, searching involves system definition, stakeholder 
placement and interaction analysis.  The goal of the searching phase is:  
• The social open collaborative system defined  
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• A refined stakeholder list with each stakeholder mapped in or out of the 
defined system 
• A listing of potential driving interactions by stakeholders in and out of the 
defined system 
• A listing of other major nonsocial system sub-elements (examples are 
natural resources, physical features, history etc.). 
Mapping is the first attempt at modeling the operational environment.  This step 
will result in a series of different models that collectively make up the operational 
environment.  This thesis does not present a specific format for environmental models 
because of the complexity and uniqueness of each operating area.  The operational 
architecting team needs to use a format that is most suited to the particular situation.  
However, an area of further research would be a series of models based on different 
historical situations that might aid an operational architecting team as a starting point.  
Finally, once the modeling is complete, the operational architects need to tell the 
operational environment story (Gharajedaghi, 2006).  This an effort to reduce the 
environmental models into a story that is communicable and understandable to those 
outside the architecting team.  This will form the foundation for communications to 
national leadership, subordinate organizations and partners.  The story needs to be as 
complete and simple as the operational environment allows.  The results of the 
environmental frame are: 
• Refined stakeholder list and purpose 
• Series of operational environment models 
• An operational environment story. 
It is very important to note, that the environmental frame must be conducted 
objectively as possible.  To some stakeholders in the system, a problem will not exist.  
Framing the operational environment from a neutral perspective is the key to accuracy.  If 
the environment is framed in light of strategic guidance or even an American lens, key 
elements of the system may be missed.  The operational environment also must not be 
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analyzed with either a solution in mind or possible constraints.  “Finally, the mess is not 
defined in terms of 1) deviations from a norm, 2) lack of resources (time, money, and 
information), or 3) an improper application of a known solution” (Gharajedaghi, 2006).   
3. Strategic Frame and Problem Frame 
Once the environmental frame is established, the strategic frame and problem 
frame will be constructed iteratively.  The environmental frame presents the current 
system where as the strategic frame and problem frame present the desired system and 
the delta between reality and strategic endstate.  This activity is tackled through a series 
of steps modeled after elements described in Gary Langford’s paper Reducing Risk of 
New Business Start-ups Using Rapid Systems Engineering  (Langford, 2006).  The 
eighteen steps are listed below. 
1. Model the desired strategic end state as defined by strategic guidance.  
This includes all conditions and requirements articulated in the strategic 
guidance. 
2. Identify the strategic value of the desired strategic end state.  Answer why 
achieving this end state is important to American strategic interests. 
3. Identify all assumptions used in conducting steps one and two. 
4. Refine the stakeholder analysis particularly the four whos in light of the 
desired strategic end state.  Also, list any assumptions used for this 
analysis. 
5. Identify obstacles between the existing operational environmental and the 
desired strategic end state. 
6. Model those obstacles within the operational environment frame. 
7. Identify stakeholders that create or interact with those obstacles.  Refine 
the stakeholder analysis for those individuals and/or organizations 
identified.  List any assumptions used in this analysis. 
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8. Map any constraints detailed or implied in the strategic guidance on the 
operational environment. 
9. Use the obstacles, constraints and associated stakeholders to model the 
initial problem. 
10.  Overlay problem frame and strategic frame onto the environmental frame. 
11.  Attempt to tell the problem story. 
12.  Redefine if possible the strategic end state based solely on desired 
strategic value.  If possible, model another end state that achieves the 
desired strategic value.   
13.  Repeat steps 1 through 11 using the alternative strategic end state. 
14.  Compare the problem frames and associated strategic end states, 
constraints and assumptions. 
15.   Decide on a problem and strategic frame. 
16.   Refine the problem story 
17.   Define the strategic value of solving the refined problem and achieving 
the desired end state.  Compare those results to the strategic value if the 
problem remains unsolved. 
18.  Repeat steps 15 to 17 until the operational architecting team understands 
the problem and strategic frame and the value added if the problem is 
solved. 
Steps one through eighteen can be repeated until the operational architecting team 
and particularly the commander are satisfied with the results and ready to proceed to the 
operational approach.  It is very possible that this process yields an alternative strategic 
end state.  If so, it will require engagement with national strategic leadership to clarify the 
true nature of the strategic guidance and come to a common understanding before 
identifying the operational approach. 
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4. Operational Approach 
The last step in operational architecting is establishing the operational approach.  
“The operational approach is a description of the broad actions that will create the 
conditions that define the desired system” (USJFCOM, 2010).  The operational approach 
is a true application of operational art to the operational environment and problem to 
achieve the strategic end state.  This process is the most familiar to military professionals 
and this approach should be formulated using the operational architecting team’s 
experience, training and judgment.  For operational architects, heuristics and insights 
from historical examples and experiences will form the basic tool kit.  The operational 
architect should continually add heuristics through discovery and experimentation during 
a career in the military profession, but an important element is not to simply focus on 
experiences or historical examples.  There is a danger of relying too heavily on tools 
already in the tool kit (Gharajedaghi, 2006).  Successful operational architecting will 
require the creation of new tools and methods vice simply relying on the past 
(Gharajedaghi, 2006).  Once the operational approach is crafted, a model must be 
constructed for communication.  It is also useful to revaluate all other elements of the 
operational design in light of the agreed upon operational approach.  
The outcome of operational architecting is the operational design.  The final 
design consists of: 
• Stakeholder Analysis 
• Environmental Frame 
• Strategic Frame 
• Problem Frame 
• Operational Approach. 
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C. OPERATIONAL PLANNING  
1. Joint Operational Planning Process 
Once the operational design is complete and certified by strategic leadership, it 
becomes the basis for the beginning of the JOPP.  The JOPP is a well-defined process 
that translates the operational requirements embedded in the operational design into an 
actionable plan and is presented in Figure 13. 
2. Links between Architecting and Planning 
The only proposed additions to the JOPP are architecture/planning reviews after 
each planning step.  These reviews compare work completed in a certain planning step to 
the operational design.  There are two purposes for these formal reviews: 
• To ensure operational planning corresponds to the approved operational 
design 
• To continually validate the operational design for accuracy and relevance.  
D. CERTIFICATION AND ITERATION 
Certification and iteration are key components of the alternative planning process.  
Certification is the process where as strategic leadership (customer) continually approves 
the alternative planning process outputs leading up to the operational plan.  The in 
progress reviews (IPR) would be much like those depicted in Figure 11.  The process 
expects to have two IPRs during the operational architecting activity that: 
• Discusses and approves the stakeholder analysis, environmental frame, 
strategic frame and problem frame; 
• Discusses and approves the operational design which includes the 
operational approach and refined products from first IPR. 
There would also be two IRPs during the operational planning activity that: 
• Discusses and approves selected COA as well as reviews refined 
operational design as applicable; 
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• Discusses and approves final operational plan. 
Finally, iteration of the process would occur for two distinct cases.  One reason for 
iteration would be dissatisfaction with the results from the commander and/or strategic 
leadership.  Another cause for iteration would be a major change within or without the 
system, which renders the original work in its current form as invalid.   
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter V has presented an alternative planning process different from that which 
is currently espoused in U.S. joint and service doctrine.  The planning process proposed 
maps out operational architecting and operational planning as two separate activities that 
together translate strategic guidance into an operational plan.  The activity of operational 
architecting is a further refinement of the design concept introduced in Chapter I and 
described in General James N. Mattis’ Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational 
Design.  Operational architecting is built upon the foundations of systems architecting as 
described in Chapter II: a systems approach, a purpose orientation, a modeling 
methodology, ultraquality implementation, certification and insights and heuristics 
(Maier & Rechtin, 2002).  The operational design is the outcome of the operational 
architecting activity and forms the foundation for all operational planning.  The 
alternative planning process utilizes the standard JOPP, only adding formal reviews that 
compare work produced during the JOPP to the operational design for consistency and 
design revalidation.  The strength of the alternative planning process is that it: 
• Offers more rigorous procedures for building an operational design 
• Elevates operational architecting to the level of operational planning and 
seamlessly integrates the two activities. 
These key features produce a planning process that is more robust and more focused on 
the strategic purpose and solving the right problem.   
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Overall, the purpose of this thesis has been to develop a framework for a USMC 
planning model.  In order to work toward that end, this thesis has: 
• Introduced operational design as described by U.S. joint doctrine in 
Chapter I 
• Explained the operational level of war as an application of systems theory 
to warfare in Chapter II 
• Presented a guiding theory for the construction of an operational design 
process based upon the foundations of systems architecting in Chapter II 
• Evaluated the effectiveness of operational design processes and activities 
as described in USMC, U.S. Army and joint planning doctrine in Chapters 
III and IV 
• Presented an alternative planning process in Chapter V. 
Currently, the MCPP is woefully deficient in its integration of operational design into its 
doctrine and activities.  U.S. Army and joint doctrine provide a better foundation but fail 
to articulate specific activities required for the construction of an operational design and 
fail to map out a seamless transition between design and planning.  The alternative 
planning process presented in Chapter V redefines operational design as operational 
architecting and builds a process based upon the foundations of systems architecting and 
the architect, builder customer model.  This process presents discreet and tangible 
activities that act as a guide for the construction of an operational design.  This design 
then becomes the basis for the more familiar JOPP and the production of the operational 
plan.  The alternative planning process as presented attempts to separate operational 




transition.  The process also utilizes a systems approach to translate strategic guidance 
(the purpose for military operations) into an actionable operational plan that directs 
tactical actions. 
The thesis recommends that the USMC adopts the alternative planning process as 
a baseline attempt to expand the role of operational design in Marine Corps Planning 
Theory.  Once the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Staff Training Program 
refines the process, the USMC should begin to experiment with the alternative planning 
process during student exercises at Marine Corps University and during Marine 
Expeditionary Forces (MEF) staff training events.  The outcome from these experiments 
should be a more robust planning theory and process that accommodates all activities 
required to effectively plan military operations that truly accomplishes the strategic 
guidance of national leaders. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis revealed three major areas for research in the view of the author.  First, 
more research needs to be conducted into the specifics of conducting operational design.  
The literature reviewed during this thesis offer very compelling definitions but very few 
details on its actual conduct.  The thesis attempted to begin that conversation by 
presenting the alternative planning process, however more research is definitely required.  
This research should be supported by not only experimentation but also historical studies 
aimed at understanding how successful military operations translated strategic guidance 
into operational plans.  Secondly, research should focus on the makeup of organizations 
that best support operational architecting and planning.  None of the literature reviewed 
even approached the subject of effective military staff organization for operational design 
and planning.  There has been no research into changing the current military staff 
organization in order to manage operational planning.  Finally, research needs to be 
conducted on how to train planning staffs.  It is useless to adopt new doctrine but not 
equip military professionals with the tools and training required to implement new 
techniques and processes.  Without training, military professionals will rely on habit 
patterns and experience especially in time-sensitive situations. 
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Planning is key to ensuring American military power promotes national policy 
and achieves strategic objectives.  Operational design is a key component of clearly 
translating guidance into actionable military plans.  Without a robust planning process 
that includes design and the ability to understand complex, ill structured situations and 
responses, the American military will continually achieve less than optimal results.  An 
updated thorough planning process and trained organizations that can implement that 
process is a small investment that can possibly avoid costly mistakes with American 
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